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1 Introduction
This research focuses on the type of security market which is the most
conducive to price discovery and information incorporation prior to takeover
announcements. The market chosen by the informed based trader will
probably be the security market which provides the greatest benefit level.
Consequently, the options market cannot be rejected of the choice of the
investor because this market offers surely more leverage. Furthermore,
according to Cao et al. (2000), the payoff of an option is truncated at the
strike price and thus the leveraged offered comes with a specifically limited
risk. And it seems that options are not redundant securities because in
asymmetric information environment and with trading frictions, it is not
possible to replicate an option with the underlying asset1.
However, options are also generally associated with higher proportional
transaction costs, less liquidity and trading in options may be more
transparent due to lower volume levels2. Therefore, it seems to be an
interesting empirical question to assess whether an informed trader will
choose between trading in the security market or in the options markets.
Nevertheless, without focusing on a particular information-revealing events,
one cannot be sure whether the lead-lag activity link between the options
and the stocks markets is simply due to transmitting speculative noise
from one market to another. By focusing on market activity prior to
corporate events announcements, we can assess the attractiveness of the
informed trading for the different type of security market. Indeed, these
operations are known to have a large positive stock price impact around
the announcement data (see the classical reference of Jensen and Ruback,
1983). Trading before the announcement date can thus be very rewarding
for the trader who has an important information.
In other words, our analysis will try to determine empirically which
markets will be chosen by the informed trading for his price discovery
activity. We begin our research by investigating option market activities
through relevant variables like open interest, volume and implied volatility.
For each of these variables, we have studied their evolution for calls and
puts between two periods: a benchmark period and a pre-announcement
period. Afterwards, we have refined our analysis by distinguishing the
options across moneyness categories (out of the money OTM, at the money
ATM and in the money ITM). The quality of the results leads us to develop
a theoretical model inspired from the model proposed by Easley et al.
(1998). It’s a sequential trade microstructure model in which traders have
1Back (1993) proves this affirmation.
2See Cao et al.(2000).
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the choice to transact between options and stock markets with risk neutral
competitive market makers.
Results confirms our intuition that around business combination event,
informed traders prefer to trade on option markets than on stock market.
It could be an indication that option market carries more information than
stock market. Moreover our analysis also shows that informed traders prefer
to trade options offering the greater leverage, that is to say they buy OTM
options and they sell ITM options. In the specific case we have examined,
it also seems that ITM puts are preferred to OTM calls in case of good event.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the theoretical
model. Section 3 presents our data. Section 4 focuses on the empirical re-
sults. These empirical results come, on the one hand, from our preliminary
investigation (descriptive statistics) and on the other hand, from our model
estimation. And finally, section 4 concludes.
2 The sequential model
In this section, we present a sequential trade microstructure model in which
trade takes place in continuous time. The model is inspired from the model
proposed by Easley et al. (1998) in which trader has the choice to transact
in option or in stock markets with risk neutral competitive market makers.
In the model, there is an asset which could be traded on a security
market S and options on that security which could be traded on an option
call market C or on an option put market P . Trades arise from market buy
and sell orders submitted by a large number of traders. A fraction of these
traders is potentially informed.
Prior to the beginning of the trading day, nature determines whether
an information event takes place. Information events are assumed to be
independent across days and to occur with probability α. If no information
event takes place the asset value is V ∗. If an information event occurs, the
asset value is V g > V ∗ with probability δ and V b < V ∗ with probability
1− δ. The asset value is revealed at the end of the trading day.
There are two groups of traders. Uninformed traders neither know the
asset value nor do they observe whether an information event occurred.
They trade for liquidity reasons or for hedging reasons. Informed traders
know whether an information event took place and observe the true
asset value. Because the value change of the security will also affect the
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put and call option prices, the informed traders will have the choice of
the venue to benefit from their information. If the value is high, they
will choose between buying the asset, buying the corresponding call
or selling the corresponding put. If the value is low, they will decide
between selling the asset, selling the corresponding call or buying the corre-
sponding put. They also will not trade when there was no information event.
Because we would like to prove that the informed trader will choose the
venue in which he obtain the greatest benefit level, we decide to refine the
sequential model, to allow the informed trader to choose between option of
different moneyness. Indeed, if the value of the security is high and that the
informed trader choose to buy a call, he will decide between buying a call
OTM (out-of-the-money), buying a call ATM (at-the-money) or buying a
call ITM (in-the-money). Inversely, if he decide to sell a put, he will choose
between selling a put OTM, selling a put ATM or selling a put ITM.
If the informed trader is rational, he will decide to buy or sell the
option of a particular moneyness which offers him the great leverage level.
In particular, if he buys an option, he will theoretically decide to buy an
OTM option, because its price is the smallest one and offers the greatest
leverage. Inversely, if he decides to sell an option, he will choose to sell an
ITM option, because he will receive the greatest premium.
On any day, arrivals of uninformed buyers and uninformed sellers are
determined by independent Poisson processes. Uninformed buyers and
uninformed sellers arrive at rate ², defined per minute of the trading day.
On days for which information events occur, informed traders also arrive
at rate µ. All of these arrival processes are assumed to be independent.
Among the informed trader arrivals, a proportion γi will choose to trade on
the security market and will buy stock (BS) or sell stock (SS). And among
the informed traders that have chosen to trade on the option markets, a
proportion βi will trade call options and (1− βi) put options. Similarly, γu
of the uninformed traders will trade on the security market and βu of the
remaining uninformed traders will trade call options.
The informed traders who decide to buy an option will choose the OTM
category with probability ωi,b (buy a OTM call -BC,O- or a OTM put
-BP,O-), and if it is not their choice, they will choose the ATM category
with probability λi,b (buy a ATM call -BC,A- or a ATM put -BP,A-). In
case of informed traders who decide to sell an option, they will trade the
ITM category with probability ωi,s (sell a ITM call -SC,I - or a ITM put
-SP,I -). If it is not the case, they will choose to trade the ATM category
with probability λi,s. Furthermore, the uninformed traders who choose the
option markets, will trade the OTM category with probability ωu. If they
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decide to not choose the OTM category, they will trade the ATM categroy
with probability λu.
Thus by definition, ωi,b will be the proportion of informed traders who
have decided to buy the option which offers them the greatest leverage,
the OTM category, if they have already decided to buy an option. And
ωi,s will be the proportion of informed traders who have decided to sell the
option which offers them the greatest leverage, the ITM category, if they
have already decided to sell an option.
The tree given in figure 1 describes the structure of the trading process.
At the first node of the tree, nature selects whether an information event
occurs. If an event occurs, nature then determines if it is a good news
or bad news event. Nodes to the left of the dotted line occur once per
day. Subsequent nodes reflect the trader selection probabilities and occurs
throughout the trading day.
Easley et al. (1996) propose a method to estimate the model parameters
Θ = {α, δ, ², µ, γi, βi, γu, βu ωi,b, ωi,s, ωu, λi,b, λi,s, λu}. Let denote XA,B with
• X designs the direction of the trade, B if it is a buy or S if it is a sell
• A designs the venue, S for the stock market, C for the call market and
P for the put market
• B designs the moneyness category in case of option market, O for
out-of-the-money, A for at-the-money and I for in-the-money.
Therefore, the likelihood of observing
Ω = {XA,B |X = B,S ; A = S,C, P ; B = O,A, I} on a good-event day of
total time T is given by:
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(1)
We can compute similarly LIb(Ω) and LIn(Ω), respectively the likelihood
of observing Ω on a bad event day and on a no-event day. The overall
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likelihood of observing Ω for a single trading day is:
L(Ω|Θ) = (1− α)× LIn(Ω) + αδ × LIg(Ω) + α(1− δ)× LIb(Ω) (2)
Since days are independent, across the I trading days the likelihood to
maximize with regard to T is the following:
L(M |Θ) =
I∏
i=1
L(Ωi|Θ) (3)
Maximization of (3) with respect to the parameter vector Θ yields
maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of interest. This model
allows us to use observable data on the number of buys and sells per day
and per market to make inferences about unobservable information events
and about the division of trades between informed and uninformed.
3 Data
Our sample consists only of one particular business combination selected
from the database of the Directorate General for Competition (DGC),
which is the European Commission’s antitrust authority. The case studied
is the acquisition of Paribas Belgium by the Bacob bank. We have decided
to restrict our research to Paribas Belgium, because it’s the target of the
operation and many studies have shown that target firms display higher
cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date than bidder
firms do. In order to determine the announcement date, two separate
sources are checked: the financial press (Les Echos and Financial Times)
and the archives of the European Commission’s DGC3.
Daily stock prices are obtained from Datastream, which is accessed
at Universite´ de Lille 2. For every day of the studied period, we use the
Euronext database (BDM) to obtain intraday best quotes, orders and trade
prices of the security. This database contains the reference information, all
orders and trades for all securities traded on the ”Premier Marche´” and the
”Second Marche´” of Euronext Paris. The Euronext database provides also
all trades and prices of the options traded on the MONEP (Marche´ des
Options Ne´gociables de Paris). For the firm, we have extracted intraday
option and security data from 120 opening days before the announcement
date to the day prior to it. We define the announcement date as date 0;
the period from date -120 to -61 ([-120,-61]) is defined as the benchmark
3Much information is available on http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition, the
official DGC web site.
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period and the one from -30 to -1 ([-30,-1]) as the pre-announcement period.
By convention, a call-option is said to be at-the-money (ATM) if its stock
price divided by its strike price ( SK ) ∈ (0.95, 1.05), out-of-money (OTM) if
( SK ) ≤ 0.95 and in-the-money (ITM) if ( SK ) ≥ 1.05. Similar terminology is
defined for puts by replacing SK by
K
S .
For this study, we also need the number of transactions initiated by
the buyers and the number of transactions initiated by the sellers for both
options and stock markets. Since this information is not provided by the
BDM Euronext intraday database, we must use an algorithm in order
to classify each trade. For the security market, we use a method which
corresponds partially to the technique developed by Lee and Ready (1990)
to infer trade direction in a quote-driven market. Indeed, since the French
market is an order-driven market, there is no designed market maker who
has the obligation to provide liquidity. In such a context, limit order traders
play a pivotal role in providing liquidity to the market. Therefore, in an
order-driven market the spread corresponds to the difference between the
best selling and buying limit orders. The BDM Euronext intraday database
provides these limits for each trade. A transaction is classified as buyer
(seller) initiated if its price is bigger (lesser) than the mid quote (average
between the corresponding best selling and buying limit orders). For the
option trades, since the BDM database does not provide these best limits,
we need to use a simpler algorithm to classify trades. We use a modified
”tick rule” method in which a trade is classified as buyer (seller) initiated
if the current trade is followed by a trade with a higher (lower) price. 4
Furthermore, we think that the size of each trade matters. Thus, when
a stock trade is classified, we take the trade size. In case of option trades,
we take the number of contracts negotiated times the size of the contract.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Pre-announcement activities
Our first task is to describe what happens across markets prior to takeover
announcements. Table 1 presents some interesting descriptive statistics
and the percentage changes in these statistics between both periods for
three kinds of assets: calls, puts and stocks. The dramatic increase of the
daily mean of put contracts (98.5%) and, most especially, of the capital
negotiated (611.8%), strikes immediately. Price, open interest and implied
4The level of misclassification of this method is greater than the level of the Lee and
Ready rule, but because the liquidity of the option market is low, this misclassification
level is attenuated.
8
volatility show similar changes and seem to indicate that something very
unusual is happening on the market: it could be a clue of informed trading.
The evolution of the same descriptive statistics on the call market is less
spectacular, though it displays an identical (but less significant) trend. If
we compare the evolution of the volume between stock and options, we
can notice that activity increases on the options market are much more
pronounced than on the underlying stock market. Indeed, the percentage
increase in capital negotiated is 84.9% for calls, 611.8% for puts and only
46.7% for the stock.
However, if the increase in volume loses some significance, the steep
increase of open interest does not. 96.4% for puts, 87.8% for calls: such a
change needs to be emphasized. Indeed, a variable like the open interest is
much more robust and reliable than a variable like the volume (number of
trades or number of contracts) in order to detect the possible presence of
informed traders5. Concerning stocks, we can easily observe the increase
(from -5% to 2%) of the cumulative abnormal return between the two
periods 6.
At the stage of the analysis, we can already draw the following conclu-
sions: puts seem more attractive to (informed) traders and appear to carry
more information; the increase in volume seems globally at least as true
for options as it does for stocks; options implied volatility increases (26.1%
for calls and 19.2% for puts), which indicates that investors indeed pay a
higher premium for options prior to takeovers; and open interest appears
as the most interesting signal of a forthcoming event.
4.2 Which option contracts do traders prefer?
The preceding analysis was still quite rough. Our next step will thus be to
deepen the analysis and to address a crucial question: which types of options
do traders prefer? Therefore we introduce a supplementary discrimination
between the options: the moneyness. We can now distinguish three kinds
of options: OTM (out of the money), ITM (in the money) and ATM (at
the money).
Which of them will choose an informed trader? A typical informed
trader tries to maximize her expected returns and minimize her trading
costs. As it is discussed in Easley et al. (1998), increasing the price of a
call (even making the call out of the money) has the effect of increasing
the leverage and hence the incentive for the informed to use that option.
5See further for explanation.
6Abnormal returns are obtained by using a simple market model.
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Therefore, among option contracts informed traders should prefer those
with high leverage and high liquidity. OTM options offer higher leverage
but are generally less liquid (with higher relative bid-ask spreads) than
ATM options. But, if the expected price movements are large, the leverage
effect should tend to dominate the liquidity effect, making OTM options an
informed trader’s instrument of choice.
So theory tells us: in case of informed trading prior to takeover
announcement, we should observe a large increase of the activity of OTM
calls and ITM puts. Moreover, we also should observe a increase of ratio of
the buyer-initiated transactions (”buys”) to the seller-initiated transactions
(”sells”) for the OTM calls and a decline of the same ratio for the ITM
puts. Indeed, a buyer will choose OTM options (because the prime is low)
while a seller will choose ITM options (because the prime is high) and
sometimes ATM ones because of their high time premium. Of course, it
implies that the investor is nearly 100%- confident that the stock price is
going to rise.
4.2.1 Implied volatility and option volume
In table 2 and 3, two variables deserve special attention: implied volatility
and open interest. Among calls, implied volatility change is the largest for
the OTM and the ATM (about 26.5%), while the largest change among
puts is due to the ITM options (26.9%). All the volatility increases are
significant according to the t-test. These increases in implied volatility
suggest that investors pay a higher premium for call and put options during
the pre-announcement period than during the benchmark period. This is
particularly true for OTM and ATM calls and for ITM puts, which seem to
be the most informative.
These results are very similar to those of Cao et al. (2000) who also
observes more information content in OTM calls and ITM puts, though
our data do not display the disequilibrium that he notices between (higher)
calls-implied volatility and (lower) puts-implied volatility. On the contrary,
it appears to us that trading on puts is at least as informative as trading
on calls. Another divergence between our results and those of Cao et
al. (2000) is the globally higher change we observe in implied volatility
(around 25%) compared to the change observed by Cao et al. (2000) (be-
tween 4.8% and 17.8%). So we cannot conclude like them that ”call option
premiums go up more than their put option counterparts prior to takeovers”.
Next, we examine the pattern of option volume change across moneyness
categories. For calls, the greatest percentage increase in volume occurs
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with the ITM options. The number of OTM calls increases from 278 to
361, a 29.7% increase between the benchmark and the pre-announcement
period. Yet, trading volume increases by 531.3% from 12 to 80 contracts
for ITM calls. According to Cao et al. (2000), it is interesting to note that,
although the increase in volume in percentage terms is the largest for ITM
calls, the increase in number of contracts is the largest for OTM calls. One
possible reason for ITM calls experiencing the highest percentage volume
increase is that, as documented in the takeover literature and as shown
in table 1, stock prices tend to increase significantly prior to takeover
announcements. Consequently, relatively more calls become in-the-money
during the pre-announcement period. If the options exchange does not
introduce call options with higher strike prices soon following the stock
price run-up, there will be fewer OTM calls remaining for investors to
trade. Indeed, for some firms that experience large price run-up, we find
fewer OTM calls available prior to takeover announcements. Thus, large
stock-price run-ups tend to cause more calls to become ITM and more puts
to become OTM during the pre-announcement period.
Unfortunately for Cao et al. (2000), our data do not support their
point. Table 4 shows that the number of available OTM calls and ITM
puts increases between the two periods, though the stock price significantly
increases. In our case, the explanation for the large change in ITM call
volume is maybe simply the very low number of contracts during the
benchmark period (a small 5 in table 3). And for the puts, the dramatic
increase in ITM put volume (2948%) clearly indicates an abnormal activity
of traders.
Another feature of crucial importance is the open interest. Compared
to the classic measure of volume (daily mean of the number of contracts),
the open interest offers two decisive advantages. First of all, it is much less
volatile than volumes, which hence gives more significant results. Secondly,
while daily volume can be contaminated by transactions of ”locals” and
speculators who open a position in the morning and close it in the evening,
the open interest is not affected by this kind of very short-term speculation
and give us a much clearer idea of the presence on the market of real
informed traders who keep a position during at least a few days and often
more. Results here are impressive: OTM, ATM and ITM call open interests
increase respectively by 307.2% (from 4503 to 18339), 2% (from 5925 to
6004) and -44.5% (from 3622 to 2009), while the OTM, ATM and ITM put
open interests increase respectively by 50.9% (from 9952 to 15020), 126.5%
(from 2375 to 5379) and 937.7% (from 452 to 4696) (all 5%-significant,
except for the ATM calls). At our sense, the fact that investors suddenly
take so many positions on OTM calls and ITM puts can only indicate the
presence of informed traders expecting an increase of the stock price.
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4.2.2 Buyer- versus seller-initiated option volume
In table 5, we present the daily average of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated
option volume for both calls and puts of various moneyness combinations.
For all calls, B − S does not show any indication of informed trading,
because it seems to remain pretty stable. However, if we look deeper at
the data, we may observe that this difference increases for OTM calls but
decreases for ITM and ATM calls, which is coherent with the thesis that
informed traders choose OTM calls rather than ITM and ATM ones. For
all puts, we can notice a 5%-significant decline of B−S. More interestingly,
the same difference B − S strongly decreases for ATM and ITM puts while
it increases for OTM puts, which continues to support the main idea of this
paper: informed traders expecting an increase of the stock price buy OTM
calls and sell ITM puts.
Another interesting point is the evolution of the B − S standard
deviation. For almost all kinds of options (except the ATM call), this
standard deviation increases, which surely indicates growing uncertainty
among investors and beliefs about a forthcoming event. People become
nervous: they buy, they sell, volumes and volatility dramatically increase
which prevent to draw clear conclusions about the significance of the
percentage change we observe, except for all puts and ITM puts where the
percentage change of B − S is 5%-significant.
4.3 The model
In this section, we estimate the model presented in section 2 for the two pe-
riods of interest, the benchmark period [-120,-61] and the pre-announcement
period [-30,-1]. The estimates are obtained through the maximization of
the likelihood function given in equation 3 and are reported in table 6.
First, we observe that the arrival rate of informed traders µ increases
between the two periods, suggesting that traders informed about the
business combination have traded prior to the announcement date. Indeed,
Table 6 shows that µ increases from 0.137 to 0.282 arrivals per minute. This
corresponds to an increase of 107% which is more important than the one
observed for the arrival rate of uninformed traders ² (78%). The probability
of having a good event δ also increases as supposed before the an-
nouncement of a business combination. What is more surprising is that the
probability of having an event decreases slightly: α goes from 0.351 to 0.311.
12
We also observe an increasing proportion of informed traders who
choose to trade on the option market, sign that this market could be
very rewarding for traders who detain some information. Indeed, the
proportion of informed traders choosing the option market (1 − γi) goes
from 5.1% to 7.6%, so an increase of 50%. This result is reported on table
7. This increase is mostly due to the increasing proportion of informed
trading on the put market, since (1− γi)(1 − βi) shows an increase of 87%
between the two periods, compared to an increase of 22% for the call market.
What is also interesting to note is that the proportion of informed
buyers who choose to trade OTM options (ωi,b) strongly increases7. It
reaches 97% of the informed buyers who choose the option markets, which
supports what have been obtained in the previous section. The results for
the informed sellers are also similar to the results of the previous section.
We observe a large increase of informed traders selling ITM options.
Nevertheless, among the informed sellers who choose the option markets,
the proportion of informed traders selling ATM options remains important
(53%).
The second part of table 7 provides also the distribution of informed
traders who choose the option markets across moneyness categories. To
compute these statistics, we have supposed that we lie on the good event
branch of the tree, which is really the case because we investigate the
behavior of the markets activity prior to business combination and it is
known that this kind of event is value-creating. We can see an increase of
107% of OTM call buyers and an increase of 3843% of ITM put sellers,
confirming again that the informed trader chooses the security which
provides him the greatest leverage. By this way, if he is a buyer, he chooses
OTM options and if he is seller he chooses ITM options. Nevertheless,
the proportion of OTM call buyers is larger than the proportion of ITM
put sellers because the proportion of ATM put sellers remains important,
results already seen in the previous section.
4.4 Conclusion
We have analyzed pre-takeover-announcement trading in the options versus
stock markets. Firstly, we have observed clear evidence of abnormal activity
on both markets before the corporate event announcement day. Moreover,
this abnormal activity turns out to be more intense in the options market.
More interestingly, results seem to show that a variable like the open
interest is of crucial importance in order to detect the presence informed
7This result is provide on the first part of the table 7.
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trading. Indeed, it is a more robust and reliable variable than volume and
its increase is 5%-significant for calls and puts.
The moneyness’ favorite options also provide information about the
pending event. When we distinguish options across moneyness categories,
we notice that some interesting trends appear. The more the call (put) is
OTM (ITM), the more its open interest and its implied volatility increase.
This common relation (and correlation) between the open interest and the
implied volatility is striking because it suggests that the open interest,
like the implied volatility, carries a significant and valuable amount of
information about future event occurrence. Furthermore, in table 5, we
find with great interest that the difference |B-S| displays a similar pattern:
the more the call (put) is OTM (ITM), the more its |B-S| increases. This
variable delivers us another crucial information too: the direction of each
trade (buyer or seller initiated). Knowing that informed traders expecting a
good event are willing to buy OTM calls and sell ITM puts, we are glad to
observe an important increase of OTM calls B−S and a dramatic decrease
of ITM puts B − S (5%-significant), which confirms our above intuition
of informed trading on the options market. Finally, the last interesting
result to point out is the global increase of the volatility (measured by the
standard deviation) of the differences B − S of almost all options, which
probably indicates growing uncertainty about the possibility of a decisive
forthcoming event.
At the light of these impressive results, we have decided to build
a sound theoretical framework inspired by Easley et al. (1998). It’s a
sequential trade microstructure model in which traders have the choice to
transact between options and stock markets with risk neutral competitive
market makers. Our estimates confirm our intuition that around business
combination event, informed traders prefer to trade on option markets
than on stock market. It could be an indication that option market carries
more information than stock market. Indeed, the proportion of informed
traders on options market has increased by 50%. Moreover our results also
confirms that informed traders prefer to trade options offering the greater
leverage, that is to say they buy OTM options and they sell ITM options,
since the percentage of informed buyers who choose OTM options increases
by a significant 69%, whereas the percentage of informed sellers who choose
ITM options increases by an incredible 2003%. In the specific case we have
examined, it also seems that ITM puts are preferred to OTM calls in case
of good event: the proportion of informed traders who buy OTM calls
increases by 107% while the proportion of informed traders who sell ITM
puts increases a comfortable 3843%.
In the near future, we wish to extend our analysis to a full sample of
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firms (targets and bidders). By this way, we will be able to perform a
cross-sectional relation. That will lead you to establish a possible trading
rule to earn abnormal profit and to prove the reality of the information
content of options market. This cross-sectional analysis will also gives us
the opportunity to show the superiority of the variable ”open interest” on
the variable ”volume” in order to detect informed trading. Up to now,
we have implemented a modified tick rule to classify trades into buys and
sells. We would like to use more robust techniques like Lee and Ready
algorithm in order to achieve that. Theses techniques require very specific
data, namely best limits of orders’ book, currently not available. Finally,
for computational efficiency, we plan to develop a equivalent but simpler
likelihood function (inspired from Easley et al. (2000)).
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the different periods
The table reports the daily average volume, option price, open interest and
implied volatility for calls and puts options. For the underlying stock, the
daily average price, volume and the cumulative abnormal return are provided.
For the options, the daily volume is measured either by the number of trades
occurring per day or by the number of contracts traded every day or by the
capital negotiated every day. These summary statistics are reported for the
benchmark period [-120,-61] and for the pre-announcement period [-30,-1]. For
each variable of interest, we test the null hypothesis of no difference in means
between the two periods by using a t-test.
Variable [-120,-61] [-30,-1] % change
CALLS No. of trades 15 19 29,2%
No. of contracts 542 759 40 %
Capital negotiated (in 103 FRF) 625 1156 84.9%*
Price 12.88 13.61 5.6%
Open Interest 14051 26392 87.8%**
Implied Volatility 21.56 27.2 26.1%**
PUTS No. of trades 5,2 6,5 23.2%
No. of contracts 349 693 98.5%**
Capital negotiated (in 103 FRF) 309 2203 611.8%**
Price 11.84 18.15 53.3%**
Open Interest 12780 25097 96.4%**
Implied Volatility 22.33 26.62 19.2%**
STOCK Price 365.9 378.2 3.3%**
Volume (in 106 FRF) 341 640 46.7%**
Cumulative Abnormal return -5% 2%
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Table 2: Statistics for different periods across moneyness categories (1)
The table reports the daily open interest and implied volatility for both calls
and puts options across moneyness categories (OTM, ATM or ITM). These
summary statistics are reported for the benchmark period [-120,-61] and for
the pre-announcement period [-30,-1]. For each variable of interest, we test
the null hypothesis of no difference in means between the two periods by using
a t-test.
Moneyness [-120,-61] [-30,-1] % change
Open Interest
CALLS OTM 4503 18339 307.2%**
ATM 5925 6004 2%
ITM 3622 2009 -44.5%**
PUTS OTM 9952 15020 50.9%**
ATM 2375 5379 126.5%**
ITM 452 4696 937.7%**
Implied Volatility
CALLS OTM 21.9 27.7 26.4%**
ATM 20.9 26.4 26.6%**
ITM 23.6 28.3 19.8%**
PUTS OTM 22.8 26.3 15.3%**
ATM 21.7 26.7 23%**
ITM 22.5 28.5 26.9%**
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Table 3: Statistics for different periods across moneyness categories (2)
The table reports the daily number of contracts, capital negotiated and option
price, for both calls and puts options across moneyness categories (OTM, ATM
or ITM). These summary statistics are reported for the benchmark period [-
120,-61] and for the pre-announcement period [-30,-1]. For each variable of
interest, we test the null hypothesis of no difference in means between the two
periods by using a t-test.
Moneyness [-120,-61] [-30,-1] % change
Number of contracts
CALLS OTM 278 361 29.7%
ATM 251 318 26.5%
ITM 12 80 531.3%*
PUTS OTM 220 388 76,2%
ATM 123 142 15%
ITM 5 163 2948%*
Capital Negotiated (in 103 FRF)
CALLS OTM 214 310 44.7%
ATM 361 601 66.2%
ITM 49 245 393.6%*
PUTS OTM 143 422 195.4%**
ATM 149 492 229.3%*
ITM 17 1289 7337.4%*
Price
CALLS OTM 7.1 7.2 2.2%
ATM 13.9 17.2 23.3%**
ITM 38.1 39.6 4.1%
PUTS OTM 6.3 10.6 68.5%**
ATM 14 21.6 54%**
ITM 37.7 53 40.5%**
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Table 4: Evolution of the number of options across moneyness categories
The table reports the evolution of the number of contracts existing across the
benchmark and the pre-announcement periods. This statistic is reported for
both calls and puts options across moneyness categories.
[-120,-61] [-30,-1] % change
CALLS All 31 36 14.8%
OTM 10 15 50.2%
ATM 6 8 28.7%
ITM 15 13 14.8%
PUTS All 31 36 14.8%
OTM 17 17 -1.3%
ATM 6 8 28%
ITM 8 11 38.5%
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Table 5: Buyer-Initiated and Seller-Initiated Volume
The table reports the daily buyer-initiated and seller-initiated volume measured by
the number of contracts traded per day for all stocks, and by the number of contracts
times the size of the contract for calls and puts and across moneyness categories.
These summary statistics are reported for the benchmark period [-120,-61] and for
the pre-announcement period [-30,-1]. For each variable of interest, we test the null
hypothesis of no difference in means between the two periods by using a t-test.
(in thousands) [-120,-61] [-30,-1] % change
STOCKS ALL Buy 299.5 778.2 61.5%**
Sell 635.2 898.0 29.3%*
B − S -335.7 -119.7 180.4%*
CALLS ALL Buy 28.9 39.6 37%
Sell 23.7 34.6 46.2%
B − S 5.2 5.0 -4.3%
PUTS ALL Buy 14.5 20.4 40.7%
Sell 19.1 46.9 145.7%**
B − S -4.6 -26.5 -478.5%**
CALLS OTM Buy 15.5 21.7 39.8%
Sell 11.5 13.3 15.9%
B − S 4.1 8.4 107%
ATM Buy 12.6 14.2 12.7%
Sell 11.7 17.1 46.5%
B − S 1.0 -2.8 -388%
ITM Buy 0.7 3.6 406%*
Sell 0.6 4.2 666%*
B − S 0.2 -0.6 -471%
PUTS OTM Buy 8.0 18.1 127.2%*
Sell 13.3 19.8 48.3%
B − S -5.4 -1.7 68.9%
ATM Buy 0.3 0.0 -90.8%
Sell 0.2 15.6 7775%*
B − S 0.1 -15.6 -28457%*
ITM Buy 6.3 2.3 -63.1%*
Sell 5.6 11.6 107.1%
B − S 0.7 -9.2 -1369%**
22
Table 6: Parameter estimates for the sequential model
The estimates are obtained through the maximization of the likelihood func-
tion given in equation 3. α is the probability of an event occurrence, δ the
probability of a good event occurrence, µ the arrival rate of informed traders,
² the arrival rate of uninformed traders, γi the proportion of informed traders
who trade on the security market, γu the proportion of uninformed traders
who trade on the security market, βi the proportion of informed traders op-
erating on the option market who have decided to trade call options, βu the
proportion of uninformed traders operating on the option market who have de-
cided to trade call options, ωi,b the proportion of informed buyers who choose
to trade OTM options, ωi,s the proportion of informed sellers who choose
to trade ITM options, ωu the proportion of uninformed who choose to trade
OTM options, λi,b the proportion of informed buyers who choose to buy ATM
options among those who have chosen not to trade OTM options, λi,s the
proportion of informed sellers who choose to sell ATM options among those
who have chosen not to trade ITM options, λu the proportion of uninformed
who choose to trade ATM options among those who have chosen not to trade
OTM options.
[-120,-61] [-30,-1] % change
α 0,351 0,311 -11%
δ 0,000 0,333 3E+32%
µ 0,137 0,282 107%
² 0,076 0,135 78%
γi 0,949 0,924 -3%
γu 0,910 0,913 0%
βi 0,571 0,464 -19%
βu 0,626 0,508 -19%
ωi,b 0,574 0,973 69%
ωi,s 0,021 0,446 2003%
ωu 0,633 0,568 -10%
λi,b 0,924 0,000 -100%
λi,s 0,932 0,963 3%
λu 0,981 0,685 -30%
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Table 7: Which options ?
The estimates are obtained through the maximization of the likelihood func-
tion given in equation 3. The first part of the table provides the proportion of
informed traders, among those who trade on the option markets, across money-
ness categories. ωi,b represents the proportion of informed buyers who choose
to trade OTM options, (1 − ωi,b)λi,b the proportion of informed buyers who
choose to buy ATM options, (1−ωi,b)(1−λi,b) the proportion of informed buy-
ers who choose to buy ITM options. Similarly, ωi,s represents the proportion
of informed sellers who choose to trade ITM options, (1−ωi,s)λi,s the propor-
tion of informed sellers who choose to buy ATM options, (1−ωi,s)(1−λi,s) the
proportion of informed sellers who choose to buy OTM options. The second
part of the table provides firstly the distribution of informed traders between
the different venues. γi represents the proportion of informed traders who
choose the stock market, 1−γi the proportion who choose the option markets,
(1− γi)βi the proportion who choose the call market and (1− γi)(1− βi) the
proportion who choose the put market. Secondly, this second part provides
the distribution of the informed traders choosing the option markets across
moneyness categories and if we suppose that we are on the good event case.
Let pi(BC,O) corresponds to the percentage of informed trader who buy a OTM
calls. The other statistics are defined similarly.
[-120,-61] [-30,-1] % change
ωi,b 57% 97% 69%
(1− ωi,b)λi,b 39% 0% -100%
(1− ωi,b)(1− λi,b) 3,2% 2,7% -16%
ωi,s 2,1% 44% 2003%
(1− ωi,s)λi,s 91% 53% -42%
(1− ωi,s)(1− λi,s) 6,6% 2% -69%
γi 94,9% 92,4% -3%
1− γi 5,1% 7,6% 50%
(1− γi)βi 2.9% 3.5% 22%
(1− γi)(1− βi) 2.2% 4.1% 87%
pi(BC,O) 1,7% 3,4% 107%
pi(BC,A) 1,1% 0,0% -100%
pi(BC,I) 0,1% 0,1% 3%
pi(SP,I) 0,1% 1,8% 3843%
pi(SP,A) 2,0% 2,2% 10%
pi(SP,O) 0,1% 0,1% -42%
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